Smart-contract flaw
An attacker exploits a coding error, such as incorrect balance accounting, repeat withdrawals, or inadequate signature and permission checks. The contract executes an operation that the project’s rules should have rejected.
Crypto hacks and exploits
Find a crypto hack by project, year or chain. The database covers attacks on DeFi protocols, centralized exchanges, bridges, wallets and other crypto services. Detailed case studies explain how each attack worked and what happened to the funds.
Incident database
Compare dates, amounts, affected services and attack mechanisms. Search includes project names and known aliases.
| Date | Project | Amount, USD | Chains | Affected service | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mt. Gox | $8.8M | Bitcoin | Centralized exchange | Access control flaw |
Annual figures
Each year shows the incident count, the sum of known estimates and the number of incidents with an estimate. The current year covers the period through 23 Oct 2026.
| Year | Incidents | Known estimates, USD | With an estimate | Without an estimate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 ↗Through 23 Oct 2026 | 319 | $2.4B | 305 | 14 |
| 2025 ↗ | 148 | $2.8B | 147 | 1 |
| 2024 ↗ | 220 | $1.7B | 208 | 12 |
| 2023 ↗ | 197 | $1.6B | 196 | 1 |
| 2022 ↗ | 187 | $3.6B | 177 | 10 |
| 2021 ↗ | 128 | $2.9B | 123 | 5 |
| 2020 ↗ | 47 | $4.0B | 46 | 1 |
| 2019 ↗ | 27 | $277.3M | 21 | 6 |
| 2018 ↗ | 31 | $1.1B | 25 | 6 |
| 2017 ↗ | 8 | $288.9M | 7 | 1 |
| 2016 ↗ | 5 | $135.7M | 5 | 0 |
| 2015 ↗ | 6 | $9.9M | 6 | 0 |
| 2014 ↗ | 6 | $486.7M | 6 | 0 |
| 2013 ↗ | 2 | $1.3M | 2 | 0 |
| 2012 ↗ | 3 | $568K | 3 | 0 |
| 2011 ↗ | 1 | $8.8M | 1 | 0 |
Each incident is counted once in annual totals, including incidents affecting several chains.
Causes and outcomes
The service type identifies who was affected; the mechanism explains how funds became accessible. An exchange may lose control of a wallet, a bridge may accept a forged cross-chain message, and a DeFi protocol may contain faulty contract calculations.
An attacker exploits a coding error, such as incorrect balance accounting, repeat withdrawals, or inadequate signature and permission checks. The contract executes an operation that the project’s rules should have rejected.
A stolen private key lets an attacker sign operations as its owner. A compromised interface works differently: it displays an expected action while submitting another operation for the user to sign.
A bridge accepts a message about an event on another chain. If message verification can be bypassed, an attacker may withdraw assets or mint tokens without a genuine deposit on the originating side.
Project creators use their privileges to take liquidity or user funds. The loss results from the actions of people who controlled the project.
A flash loan provides funds for a single transaction and must be repaid before it ends. During an attack, it can amplify price or governance manipulation; a flaw in the protocol’s calculations or rules makes the theft possible.
The original estimate describes the scale of an attack. Returns, freezes and reimbursements describe subsequent actions involving the funds. Each measure has a distinct meaning.
Methodology and data
The database covers hacks and other crypto-asset incidents affecting DeFi, exchanges, bridges, wallets and related services. The year follows the event date; chains identify where affected assets or contracts were located.
All amounts are expressed in US dollars using the estimate for the incident. The total adds known original estimates before recoveries and reimbursements. Token price changes can explain differences between estimates of the same event.
Amounts are known for 1278 of 1335 incidents; 57 have no established estimate. “No estimate” preserves that distinction. A zero amount is shown separately as 0 USD.
One event may have several names, such as Wormhole and Portal. Search connects these names to one incident page. An incident affecting several chains is counted once in annual figures.
The database is updated hourly. The data update time appears above the summary; detailed case studies carry a separate review date.
Detailed case studies link to project reports, technical research and other sources. These links document the attack mechanism, amount estimate and subsequent outcome.
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